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Abstract 
This paper empirically probes the nexus between political instability and economic growth in 
Guyana using time-series data covering the period 1961 – 2018 and GARCH (1,1) models. The 
results show that changes in the Head of State (HOS) exert a positive and significant impact on 
real GDP growth rates, while strikes have the opposite effect on economic growth. Other proxies 
of political instability, such as political assassinations, riots, insurrection, and terrorism, are not 
significantly related to growth in real GDP because of the dispersed nature of economic activities 
and their negligible effect on production and productivity. When the proxies of political instability 
are added to the conditional variance equation, the results indicate that only changes in Head of 
State (HOS) moderate volatility in growth rates. This is probably due to transitory goodwill 
enjoyed by the incoming Head of State that serves to dampen ethnic tensions, reducing instability. 
The latter result indicates the importance of democratic turnover.  
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I. Introduction 
Guyana, the largest country in terms of land area in the Commonwealth Caribbean, is endowed 
with vast natural resources compared with its counterparts (Grenade and Pasha, 2012). The country 
has bountiful agricultural lands, minerals (gold, diamond, rear earth, and bauxite), freshwater, and 
forest cover with tremendous carbon credit potential. Recently, the country discovered large 
quantities of hydrocarbon deposits that are being explored by Anadarko Petroleum Corporation, 
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CGX energy Inc., Eco Atlantic Oil and Gas, Exxon Mobil, Hess Corporation, JHI Associates Inc., 
Ratio Oil Exploration Limited Partnership, Repsol, and Tullow Oil Plc. Recent estimates put the 
total reserves at 5.5 billion barrels, making it one of the countries with the largest oil reserves. 
Notwithstanding the abundance of natural resources, Guyana is the least developed country in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean, ranking 125 according to the 2019 Human Development Index (HDI).   
 
Several studies attempted to explain the economic performance of the country since independence. 
For instance, Thomas (1982) attributes the country's economic collapse during the 70s and 80s to 
fiscal mismanagement, migration of skilled Guyanese, social, political, institutional fragilities, and 
statists' political posture. Gafar (1996) credits the robust economic performance during the 1990s 
to a shift in policy stance and policy dividends that accrued from the government's market-oriented 
policies under the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP). Staritz, Atoyan, and Gold (2007) link 
the economic downturn during the 2000-2004 period to deterioration in factor accumulation and 
investments, while IDB (2008) attributed the country's economic stagnation since 1997 to 
numerous shocks, including El Nino, flooding, deterioration in export prices and loss in 
preferential markets for rice and sugar. Additionally, Khemraj (2008) argues that the country's 
economic development was impeded by the banking system's oligopolistic nature that blunted 
financial reforms' impact during its post-liberalized regime. More recently, Grenade and Pasha 
(2012) argue that improved governance, sound macroeconomic management coupled with 
favorable terms of trade, was responsible for the five consecutive years of strong economic growth 
during 2006-2010. Finally, Khemraj (2016, 2019, 2020) provides a theoretical framework 
demonstrating how ethnic mobilization and conflict over economic resources – such as 
government jobs, state contracts, scholarships, and other privileges – retard economic growth. This 
author relies on the prisoners' dilemma and stag hunt games to explain why a less and ideal long-
term income growth will result from ethnic conflict and polarization in Guyana.  
 
Unlike the theoretical analysis of Khemraj, this work goes further by quantifying the impact of 
political instability, including the ethno-political conflict, on economic growth. Even though the 
country's history has been tainted by severe episodes of political instability over the past six 
decades, no previous study assessed the empirical relationship or impact of political instability on 
the economy's performance. This study attempts to address this gap in the literature by using 
econometric tools similar to Sandler and Enders (2010) and Tabassam, Hashmi, and Reham 
(2016). It will also add to the strand in the literature that utilizes data from a single country that is 
short in supply. Additionally, it will provide additional evidence regarding the relationship 
between economic growth and political instability in a poor resource-rich country. 
 
The remainder of the paper continues as follows. The next section provides a discussion of political 
instability over the past six decades. Section III reviews the literature, while section IV explains 
the econometric methodology, and section V presents and discusses the empirical results. Section 
VI concludes with recommendations. 
 
II. History of political instability in Guyana 
The quest for political and economic dominance by the two major voting blocs have contributed 
to the continuous ethno-political conflicts since the country gained independence. This section 
chronicles the historical evolution of the conflict to distill the various manifestations of political 
instability over the past five decades. The figure below highlights some of the most violent 
episodes of the conflict.  
Figure 1: Evolution of economic growth, 1961-2018 
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Guyana may be described as a plural society that was shaped by the country’s colonial history. 
Prior to independence, the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) was formed in 1950 as a multi-cultural 
party, headed by Dr. Cheddi Jagan and Linden Forbes Burnham (Premdas, 2004). This party won 
the first parliamentary elections in 1953 that saw Cheddi Jagan elevated to the position of leader 
of Parliament and Forbes Burnham, becoming the leader of the party (Myers and Calder, 2011). 
The PPP only lasted 133 days in office as it was overthrown by the British, which also suspended 
the constitution on the grounds that the PPP was a Communist party (Hinds, 2010). However, 
because of competition between these leaders, there was a split in the party in 1957 with Cheddi 
Jagan remaining with the PPP and Forbes Burnham forming his party, the People’s National 
Congress (PNC) (Myers and Calder, 2011). The split divided the country along racial lines, where 
the East Indians and Africans supported the PPP and PNC, respectively (Hinds, 2010). Following 
the split, the PPP won the two elections in 1957 and 1961 since it attracted support from the 
majority East Indian population.  
 
Fearing domination, the PNC collaborated with the United Force (UF) to destabilize the PPP. This 
campaign started with a mass protest by the People’s National Congress (PNC) and Trade Union 
Congress (TUC) against the Budget of the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) (Stabroek New, 2009). 
Massive riots, described as Black Friday, followed the protest on February 16, 1962, and resulted 
in the destruction of 56 premises and damage to 87 premises and looting of 66 premises in 
Georgetown (Ishmael, 2004). The campaign continued in 1963 and 1964 as part of an orchestrated 
strategy supported by the United States (US) to destabilize the PPP government. In 1963, a major 
strike (80-days strike) that was initiated by the TUC in response to the introduction of the Labour 
Relations Bill by the Government. This strike, which was supported by the PNC, TUF, 
Georgetown Chamber of Commerce, police force, International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions (ICFTU), ended with nine deaths (Stabroek New, 2009). The following year, 1964, there 
were two significant events, the riots in Wismar and Sun Chapman explosion. The former resulted 
in the destruction of more than 200 properties, the death of five persons, assault of fifty persons, 
and at least seven rapes while the latter claimed the lives of forty-three persons who were on their 
way from Linden to Georgetown. Other notable events were the attempt to kill the PPP leadership 
that caused the death of Micheal Forde at Freedom House on July 1964 and the bombing of twelve 
buildings in Georgetown that was part of the so-called X-13 plan.  All of these events were 
attributed to the toxic political climate in 1964. According to police records, the disturbances 
during this period resulted in the death of 176 persons, the destruction of 1,425 buildings, and the 
displacement of 15,000 persons.2 A state of emergency was eventually declared, and the United 
Kingdom undertook electoral reforms. Elections were called subsequently under the system of 
Proportional Representation (PR). The PNC and United Force (UF) joined forces to remove the 
Government led by Jagan under the new electoral system.   
 
The coalition government fell apart. A second election was held under PR in 1968 but with the 
provision for postal voting. The PNC obtained 55.8 percent of the votes in these elections that 
were considered rigged. On January 2, 1969, the inhabitants (white settlers and indigenous people) 
of the Rupununi district staged an insurrection because they felt government policies were eroding 
their constitutional rights. This rebellion was swiftly and violently quelled. Approximately 100 
persons lost their lives, and many indigenous citizens of Rupununi fled to nearby Brazil and 
Venezuela.  
 
On February 23, 1970, the PNC government officially declared Guyana as a Cooperative Socialist 
Republic to consolidate its political power by taking control over the country's productive 
resources to reduce foreign and local capitalists' influence.3 Elections were held in 1973 but were 
not uneventful. Two young voters were fatally shot during these elections by the member of the 
Guyana Defence Force (GDF). Following these elections, the PNC enunciated the doctrine of 
'paramountcy of the party' in 1974 at a Special Congress of the PNC. Under this doctrine, the PNC 
used the state to suppress the people. A massive strike was staged by sugar workers on August 
1977 that lasted 135 days and literally crippled the economy. The ruling party claimed that this 
strike was motivated by politics rather than economics since the trade union representing sugar 
workers were aligned to the opposition PPP. During the 1970s the ruling party utilized the House 
of Israel to intimidate is political opponents and citizens. On July 14, 1979, Father Benard Darke 
was murdered by members of the House of Israel while photographing a demonstration by the 
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Working People's Alliance (WPA) on Brickdam. The following year, the WPA leader, Dr. Walter 
Rodney, was assassinated in Georgetown with an explosive device.   
 
To further consolidate its position, PNC promulgated a new constitution on October 6, 1980, after 
extending the National Assembly's life twice in 1978 and 1979. Elections were held in December 
1980 with the PNC securing a more significant majority. The leader of the PNC. Forbes Burnham 
died on August 6, 1985, and was succeeded by his Vice President, Desmond Hoyte, who held 
elections in December 1985. Like the elections before, there was violence and claims of electoral 
fraud. Some claimed that the cold war was responsible for the United States' indifference and other 
powerful countries concerning electoral fraud, human rights violations, and undemocratic rule by 
PNC. The Marxist/Leninist orientation of the PPP made this party a threat to the United States 
regarding South America as its back yard. As such, it was not in the United States' interest to get 
involved in Guyana's political struggle, which would see the PPP returned to power.    
 
However, with the end of the Cold War, the country was granted a new lease on life by the Carter 
Centre's intervention, which paved the way for free and fair elections in 1992. It is important to 
note that these elections were held two years beyond the original schedule to allow for the 
sanitization of the voter lists. Even though elections in 1992 were dubbed free and fair by 
international observers, the PNC promoted its supporters to storm the election commission before 
the announcement of the results shortly after the riot spread to the commercial center of 
Georgetown, where many stores were looted.  
 
Once the dust from the disturbance settled, however, the economy took off with the infusion of 
domestic and foreign investment and programmes designed to address the many constraints to 
private sector growth. The economy posted robust economic growth for seven consecutive years, 
averaging 7.1 percent per annum.  
 
The country held fresh elections on December 15, 1997. Cries of "systematic campaign of 
victimization and discrimination" against Afro-Guyanese by the opposition PNC leader, Mr. 
Desmond Hoyte, before these elections, created the conditions for the violent protest on January 
12, 1998 (US State Department, 2009).4 Unlike the 1992 elections, the violence was not short-
lived but occurred sporadically for several months between during the period 1998-2001 in the 
form of street protests that turned violent (ibid, 2009). During this period, the commercial center 
was the prime victim of the instability created by the protest. The opposition PNC and PPP/C 
brokered a peace accord to end the violence on January 17, 1998. However, in April 1999, the 
Guyana Public Service Union (GPSU) initiated a general strike that lasted for 56 days that 
paralyzed the country.5 In August of the same year, Janet Jagan announced her retirement due to 
ill health, and Bharrat Jagdeo assumed the position of President. The elections of 1997 were also 
rendered 'null and void' by the court, and fresh elections were forced in 2001, cutting the term of 
the government. These elections were preceded by mass demonstrations over the distribution of 
voter identification cards that continued even after the elections were completed and declared free 
and fair by independent observers. 
 
The Opposition leader, Desmond Hoyte, and new President Bharrat Jagdeo announced 
'confidence-building measures' to end the violence that flowed from the 2001 elections. But by 
March 2002, the opposition parties staged a walkout of the 2002 Budget Debate, and a period of 
social unrest ensued. The disturbances culminated in the Office of the President's attack on July 3, 
2002, by opposition protestors.6 The instability intensified when five high-profile prisoners 
escaped from the Camp Street prison on February 23, 2003. These prisoners were linked to a series 
of murders, including the Lusignan, Bartica, and Agricola, Lindo Creek massacres, where more 
than 55 persons were killed. However, the escapees were hailed freedom fighters and received 
support from members of the opposition party. One of the members of the gang was even given a 
hero's funereal. 
 
After the prolonged period of instability, the two main political parties agreed to constitutional 
reform that saw the establishment of various Commissions and Parliamentary Committees 
designed to ensure greater equity in distributing the country's national patrimony. Under a new 
constitution, the country had relatively peaceful elections in 2006, 2011, and 2015. 
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Notwithstanding the peaceful nature of the elections in 2011, there were two significant unrests 
after these elections. On July 18, 2012, a protest erupted in Linden against the removal of subsidy 
for electricity for the mining town. During the demonstration, the mining town residents blocked 
the Wismar-Mackenzie Bridge, which is one of the main arteries to the interior region. The 
situation deteriorated when the police attempted to remove the protestors from the bridge. Several 
buildings and vehicles were destroyed, and four persons were killed. Another round of unrest 
erupted on October 11, 2012, at Agricola, where the East Bank highway was blocked and many 
persons robbed. Following these protests, the combined opposition threatened to carry a no-
confidence motion against the government. This forced the government to call early elections since 
the combined opposition parties had a majority.  
 
After another extended period of instability, the elections of 2015 saw the installation of a new 
government formed by the APNU-AFC government. As in the 1960s, the PPP was displaced by a 
coalition. However, the new government's life was cut short by a no-confidence vote successfully 
passed in parliament when one of its members voted with the opposition. Since then, the country 
has been at a standstill as the government attempted to extend its life by challenging the no-
confidence vote's validity. Based on the country's final court ruling, the Caribbean Court of Justice 
(CCJ), the government is constitutionally bound to hold elections by September 2019. However, 
the government refused to comply with the constitutional deadline and held elections on March 2, 
2020. After the conclusion of the elections, the government also held onto power, forcing the 
contesting parties to take court actions to declare the results. During this period there were sporadic 
protests in several villages but not for any extended duration. A vehicle with school children was 
attacked, and one person lost his life. Coupled with international pressure, GECOM finally 
declared the winner and a new government was sworn-in on August 2, 2020. Almost one month 
after the swearing-in of a new government, fresh protests were initiated in Berbice and other 
villages over the brutal killing of two teenagers. Two persons lost their lives and several properties 
destroyed.  
 
  
Box 1: Significant events associated with political instability  
Major Events Consequences 
February 16, 1962 
Black Friday 
Riots in Georgetown where 56 premises were destroyed, 87 buildings and 66 building 
were damaged and looted respectively.  
April 18-July 8, 1962 
80-days strike 
The strike ended with nine deaths and many injuries. 
May 20-25, 1964 
Wismar Riots 
1964 Wismar Riots. More than 200 properties were destroyed, five persons killed, 
fifty persons assaulted and at least seven rapes reported.  
July 6, 1964 
Sun Chapman bombing 
Sun Chapman explosion where forty-three persons lost their lives while travelling 
from Linden to Georgetown. 
January 2, 1969 
Rupununi Uprising 
The insurrection by Residents in the Rupununi district that is popularly known as the 
Rupununi Uprising. Almost 100 persons lost their lives and many indigenous resident 
in Rupununi fled to Brazil and Venezuela. 
July 16, 1973 
Ballot Box Martyrs 
Bholanauth Permanand and Jagan Ramessar were fatally shot by members of the 
Guyana Defence Force (GDF) at No. 63 Village Corentyne protecting ballot boxes  
August 1977- January, 
1978 
135 days sugar strike 
Many strikers and PPP activist were arrested during the strike for intimidation.  
July 14, 1979 Father Benard Dark murdered by members of the House of Israel during a protest by 
the Working People’s Alliance 
June 13, 1980 Leader of the WPA assassinated in Georgetown with explosive device 
Jan 12, 1998 Riots in Georgetown where approximately 800 persons were assaulted and 10,000 
experienced restriction in movements. 
April 1999 General strike initiated by the GPSU that paralyzed the country. 
February 23, 2002 Jail break 
February 27, 2006 Agricola Massacre 
April 22, 2006 Agriculture Minister Satyadeow Sawh was killed with two siblings and a security 
guard. 
August 8, 2006 Five pressmen were executed at Kaieteur News printing press located in Eccles. 
January 26, 2008 
Lusignan massacre 
Lusignan stormed by members of the fine man gang who killed 11 residents 
February 17, 2008 
Bartica massacre 
Twelve persons were killed and five injured in the attack of Bartica by the gang 
June 2008 
Lindo Creek massacre 
Eight gold miners were killed by the “Fine man” gang at Lindo Creek. 
July 2012 
Linden Unrest 
Protestors blocked the Wismar-Mackenzie Bridge blocked preventing vehicles from 
entering the interior. Several buildings and vehicles destroyed and four persons killed 
during the attempt to remove the protestors from the bridge. 
October 2012 
Agricola unrest 
The protest resulted in the blockade of the East-Bank highway. Several persons were 
robbed. 
 
III. Literature Survey 
Many scholars have attempted to define political instability in the extant literature. However, 
because political instability is a broad and complex concept and is not directly observable, finding 
a standard definition has been a challenge to scholars. Political instability has been defined, inter 
alia, as a breakdown of institutionalized patterns of authority in a political system (Morrison and 
Stevenson, 1971), the propensity to change executive power either through constitutional or 
unconstitutional means (Alesina et al., 1996), events that generate uncertainties regarding the 
present political system or government (Gyinmah-Brempong and Traynor, 1999), changes or 
challenges to a political system (Jong-A-Pin, 2008), and the propensity of a country to not only 
experience regime and government change but violence (political, religious and ethnic) and 
practices that impacts on contracts, law and order, and stability and efficiency of institutions 
(Burger, Ianchovichina, and Rijkers, 2013).  
 
The importance of political stability, as it relates to economic performance, may be traced back to 
the work of Adam Smith, Simon Kuznets, and other theorists who underscored the impact of 
institutional and political factors on economic growth (Haan and Siermann, 1996; and Gurgul and 
Lukasz, 2012). Since then, the nexus between political instability and economic growth has been 
widely discussed at the theoretical level. Over the last decade, this topic also received the most 
attention from empirical research by Sandler and Enders (2010) as well as (Baklouti and 
Boujelbene, 2020). 
 
The theoretical literature has extensively articulated how political instability affects economic 
growth through various channels. Drawing on the theoretical literature, Cervantes and Villasenor 
(2015) contend that political stability influences economic growth through investment, savings, 
labor market disruption, and productivity/production levels of private agents and monetary and 
fiscal policies of the government.  Munoz (2009) argues that political instability affects growth 
through the investment channel (reduction in physical and human capital accumulation and 
changes in its composition that favours short-run investments), socio-political unrest channel 
(reduces productivity caused by a disruption in normal economic activities), and sub-optimal 
economic policy channel (politically driven sub-optimal policies that are caused by the fear of not 
re-elected to office.  Meanwhile, Baklouti and Boujelbene (2020) explain that political instability 
leads to a break in production activity and increasing transaction costs that could prevent a country 
from realizing its true potential, which is essential for achieving economic growth. This study also 
argues that political instability discourages investments (both foreign and local) that adversely 
affect economic growth and cause a government to disregard their commitment or engage in 
clientelistic allegiances and corruption, which harms growth (ibid, 2000).  
 
Because political stability cannot be observed directly and works through various channels, and is 
abstract, various proxies have been employed in the literature to empirically determine its 
relationship with economic growth. Some of the proxies include the number of violent events, e.g., 
military coups, assassinations, violent revolutions, purges (Barro, 1991; Shehzadi et al., 2019; and 
Campos and Karanasos, 2008); propensity to change the government via constitutional and 
unconstitutional means (Alesina et al., 1992), the number of years the chief executive has been in 
office, corruption in political elections (e.g., vote fraud or candidate intimidation), the duration of 
autocratic or democratic regimes, illegal or forced change in the top government elite (armed 
rebellion), the size of the cabinet measured by the number of ministers, the level of freedom 
available for people in practicing political rights, and the number of years since the most recent 
regime change (Abdelkader, 2017); cabinet changes (Aisen and Veiga, 2011); the number of 
terrorist incidents, number of strikes, elections, external wars (Asteriou and Price, 2001), number 
of political strikes, demonstrations, riots, impeachment and change in head of key public economic 
institutions (Munoz, 2009); occurrence of various coups e.g. successful coups, absorptive, and plot 
coups (Fosu, 2011); number of constitutional changes (Campos and Karanasos, 2008); change in 
prime minister (Gurgul and Lukasz, 2012); number of government changes (de Haan and 
Siermann, 1996); and polarization and fractionalization (Ejaz and Khan, 2019). While some 
studies have used individual variables, others have employed indices to capture the various 
dimensions of political instability (Ejaz and Khan, (2019).   
 
The empirical studies that shed light on the relationship between economic growth and political 
stability have found varying and inconclusive results. Some studies have found that the 
relationship is unidirectional, while others have found bi-directional causality (Sweidan, 2016). In 
some cases, the relationship is negative or positive and statistically significant. Some studies have 
not found any significant relationship.  
 
The extant literature has tested the link between political instability and economic growth at the 
country level and across countries in developed, developing, and transition economies. Most of 
the empirical studies have utilized cross-sectional or region-specific information (Sweidan, 2016).  
Using data for 98 countries during the period 1960-1985, Barro (1991) found that political 
instability (manifested in the number of assassinations, violent revolutions, and military coup) is 
negatively correlated with economic growth. Alesina et al. (1992) found an inverse relationship 
between per capita GDP growth and political instability (measured by constitutional and 
unconstitutional changes in government) using a panel dataset of 113 countries during 1950-1982. 
In their attempt to determine whether political instability affected the economic growth of smaller 
geographic areas and whether the results were sensitive to the definition of political instability, de 
Haan and Siermann (1996) found that political stability economic growth in Africa but no 
countries in Latin America and Asia. A sample consisting of 97 countries from 1963 to 1988 was 
utilized. Fosu (2001) explored the impact of coups on economic growth in 31 sub-Saharan Africa 
using cross-section data from 1960 to 1986, found a significant relationship between growth and 
instability measured by an index that captures successful coups, absorptive coups, and coup plots. 
The author contended that models that utilized this variable provide the best results representing 
the relationship between growth and instability as it passes various diagnostic tests. Using a panel 
dataset of 165 countries covering the from 1960 to 2004, Aisen and Veiga (2011) found that 
political instability contributed to lower growth by lowering the rates of productivity and physical 
and human capital accumulation. Gurgul and Lukasz (2012) investigate the nexus between 
political stability and growth using panel data for 10 CCE countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungry, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) over the period 
1990-2009. The authors' defined political instability as the propensity for government change (or 
political instability). Two variables were used, the first is the change in prime minister (major 
change), and the other is a change in government. The study found political instability harmed 
economic growth. Shehzadi et al. (2019) utilized ten variables and classified them to capture 
political instability's formal and informal dimensions. Following Campos and Karanasos (2008), 
the article classified assassinations, strikes, purges, riots, revolutions, cabinet changes, executive 
changes as informal political stability and legislative elections, and constitutional change as formal 
political stability. A heteroskedastic consistent OLS estimation technique and data for 103 
countries from 1984-2011 were used to investigate the relationship between economic growth and 
these variables. The article found that coups, formal political instability, cabinet changes, and 
legislative elections adversely impact economic growth.  
 
Meanwhile, Elbargathi and Al-Assaf (2019) examined the impact of political stability on economic 
growth using panel data for five Arab countries and the Vector Error Correction Model. The study 
found a strong relationship between political instability and growth, which the author argues is 
consistent with the literature's general findings. More recently, Maryam et al. (2020), employing 
the Pooled Ordinary Least Square estimation technique and data for 2002-2018, showed that 
political stability impacts selected countries in the SAARC region. The authors contend that these 
countries can attract greater investment and encourage growth by ensuring political stability.  
 
Departing from the cross-country as mentioned earlier studies, Asteriou and Price (2001) used a 
single variable to capture political instability. They constructed several time series variables to 
determine how each impacted growth in the United Kingdom during 1961-1997. The author 
argued that this approach would allow for a more detailed examination of the nexus between 
political stability and growth, considering the institutional and historical characteristics of a 
country and the effect of the political instability on the conditional variance of GDP. In this study, 
the authors constructed six proxies of instability: the number of terrorist incidents, the number of 
strikes, elections, change in government, external wars (Falkland and Gulf) 
 
The empirical results show that economic growth is directly affected by political instability. Using 
an Error Correction Model and time-series data from 1972 to 2013, Abdelkader (2017) found a 
negative relationship between political stability and Egypt's economic growth. Proxies of political 
instability, in the paper, included: the number of years the chief executive has been in office, 
corruption in political elections (e.g., vote fraud or candidate intimidation), the duration of 
autocratic or democratic regimes, illegal or forced change in the top government elite (armed 
rebellion), the size of the cabinet measured by the number of ministers, the level of freedom 
available for people in practicing political rights, and the number of years since the most recent 
regime change. The empirical results suggest that the political instability variables impacted 
growth, but the impacts' magnitude differs. In their article, Campos and Karanasos (2008) 
examined the relationship between political instability and growth using power-ARCH and annual 
data covering 1986-2000 for Argentina. The authors employed variables that capture 'formal 
instability' (number of elections and the number of constitutional changes) and 'informal 
instability' (assassinations and general strikes). The formal measures of instability impacted 
growth directly, while the informal measures mostly indirectly impacted growth. Using ARCH 
and GARCH models, Tabassam et al. (2016) and time-series data covering the period 1988-2010 
investigates the link between political stability and economic growth. The article used dummy 
variables for terrorism, election, regime, and strikes that were treated as proxies for political 
instability. It found that only terrorism had a significant negative relationship with economic 
growth. The authors interpreted their findings to mean that terrorism disrupted market activities 
and discouraged investments, lowering productivity. However, volatility in GDP was explained 
by election and regime change. In a case study of Jordan, Sweidan (2016) found that per capita 
GDP is adversely affected by local instability, border instability, regional instability, and the index 
constructed from the exploratory factor analysis.  The author argued that government expenditure 
is an important transmission channel. Murad and Alshyab (2019) employed an empirical model 
that estimates growth economic growth rate based on political instability, growth rates of capital 
and labour, and trade openness. It found that output growth was negatively affected by freedom 
rate, crime and cabinet changes, and a positive relationship between output growth and border 
instability. 
 
Literature on political instability in Guyana 
As noted earlier, this study is motivated by the absence of any empirical research that links 
economic growth to political stability even though Guyana's post-independence history is littered 
with several episodes of political instability that incarnated in violent protests, riots, political 
assassinations, politically-motivated crime spree, and even insurrection. Indeed, Hinds (2010) 
argues that Guyana has been in a permanent state of instability since the 1997 elections due to the 
tendency of 'losing parties to accept election results or cooperate with the government after 
elections' (ibid, 2010, 333). According to Hinds, the political instability manifests in extra-
parliamentary actions such as boycotting parliament and street demonstrations, which often 
culminate in attacks of PPP's supporters. Hinds also notes that these events occurred even as the 
PPP government struggled to gain the corporation of 'African-dominated institutions, such as the 
police, army, and civil service' (ibid, 2010, 335.).  
 
In an earlier study, Hinds (2005) contends that after replacing the authoritarian PNC regime in 
1992, political stability intensified to the point where the state became 'dysfunctional' and 
ungovernable. Hinds argued that the best example of the dysfunctional state was the virtual siege 
by 'political criminals' who targeted citizens, mainly, Indo Guyanese. According to Hinds, political 
criminals 'usurped the police's role and engaged in social and political terror and the dispensation 
of their own form of justice' (ibid, 2005, 69).  
 
The forgoing were not the only studies to highlight the instability during the 90s. Like Hinds 
(2005), Kissoon argues that the main opposition party, PNC, tacitly supported the criminals who 
terrorized the citizens during the crime spree. According to Kissoon, the criminals' actions were a 
response to the marginalization of African Guyanese who supports the PNC. In his study, Kissoon 
(2007) shows that the PNC has always used violence as a political tool. 
 
Myers and Calder (2011) argue that election disputes triggered public unrest that followed the 
1992, 1997, and 2001 elections. Like Kissoon (2007) and Hinds (2010 and 2005), Myers and 
Calder agree that the crime wave during the 2002-2003 period had both ethnic and political 
dimensions as the victims were mainly East Indians and the criminals received support from the 
‘opposition political parties, media personalities and former military personnel’ (p. 22). 
According to the authors the political masterminds wanted to use the criminals to destabilize and 
remove the government. In their study, Myers and Calder also chronicle the history of the 
ethnopolitical violence from the 19660s to 2000s. According to the authors, between 1961 and 
1964, the social and political instability manifested in various forms (strikes, protest actions, 
blockades and political subterfuge) which deteriorated into ‘near-genocidal warfare between East 
Indians and African politicized communities” where many ‘hundreds were killed, thousands 
displaced, and millions of dollars in homes and property destroyed’ (p. 2). The political instability 
manifested in the 135-day long sugar strike in 1977 and assassination of Dr. Walter Rodney in 
1980 while it incarnated in election related street protests, court actions, ethnic violence and crime 
spree in the 1990s and 2000s according to Myers and Calder.     
 
The many incarnations of political instability have been attributed to the struggle for political and 
economic power between the Indo Guyanese and African Guyanese. The PPP and PNC, 
respectively represent them. Premdas (2004), which echoes Despres (1975, 1969), explains that 
the competition for jobs and resources drives Guyana's ethnic conflict. Similarly, Norton (2007) 
argues that political conflict in Guyana is an expression of the two large ethnic voting bloc's desire 
to control the resources by capturing the government.  
 
Much of the literature on ethno-political contestation in Guyana is descriptive. However, Dev 
(1991) and Ramharack (1992) went one step further in proposing a theoretical framework for 
analyzing ethnic conflict in Guyana. They applied the inter-country security dilemma from 
International Relations to intra-country ethnic conflict. They proposed the thesis of the ethnic 
security dilemmas (ESDs) – an Indo-Guyanese dilemma and an Afro-Guyanese dilemma. 
According to Dev and Ramharack, the Afro-Guyanese dilemma stems from the fear of being 
unable to win a free and fair election owing to the Indian numerical advantage. The Indo-Guyanese 
dilemma is rooted in physical insecurity since the other dominant group predominates in the civil 
service, army, police, and the capital city.  
 
Khemraj (2016) was the first to make an explicit connection between the ESDs and long-term 
economic growth in the subgame Nash equilibrium theoretical framework under the pre-1992 PNC 
dictatorship and the prisoners’ dilemma under the return of free and fair election in 1992. Both 
situations led to less than desirable growth outcomes, according to the prediction of the models. In 
his 2019 paper, Khemraj further clarifies how the ESDs can be expressed in a prisoners’ dilemma 
and how voters' impatient discount rate leads to short-termism and non-cooperation – hence 
perpetuating what he labels a colonial underdevelopment trap of sub-optimal economic growth. 
Finally, in Khemraj (2020), the author further develops the two ESD thesis – this time introducing 
leadership conflict using a one-period prisoners’ dilemma game and pro-ethnic voting in a stag 
hunt. The leaders are motivated by a preference of “joy of destruction” or malevolent utilities. In 
both cases, uncertainty regarding how the other side will behave leads to non-cooperation, the 
desire to sabotage the winner, and lower long-term economic growth. 
 
IV. Methodology 
This study follows closely Tabassam et al. (2016), which utilized a GARCH (1,1) models where 
the growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is taken as the dependent variable. The econometric 
approach is considered appropriate since previous studies have found convincing evidence of 
volatility clustering in economic growth rates using GARCH models (see Fang and Miller, 2008). 
Like Tabassam et al (2016), several dummy variables are employed to capture political stability, 
which originates from the conflict between the two major political parties and their supporters. 
These are mass violence (riots), insurrection, political assassinations, anti-government 
demonstrations and major strikes, and domestic terrorism (politically motivated crime spree). 
Proxies for the change in the head of state and insurrection are also used to measure the impact 
these events in line with extant literature. The proxies are assigned ‘1’ when the particular event 
occurs and ‘0’ otherwise.   
 
The estimation process commences with an examination of the GDP series to determine if it 
follows a random walk by performing the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF, 1979), Phillip-Perron 
(PP, 1998), and Kwiatkowski et al. (KPSS, 1992). These tests are performed with intercept, as well 
as, intercept and trend. Since previous studies have found structural breaks in long time series data 
for GDP, the Zivot and Andrews (1992) unit root test with structural break is also utilized (see 
Fand and Miller, 2008).  
 
Following Tabassam et al. (2016), the AR(1) model is estimated and residual examined to 
determine the presence of autoregression in the GDP time series and autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedasticity (ARCH) effect. Similar to Tabassam et al. (2016), the AR(1) model is also 
estimated to ascertain the appropriateness of using the GARCH (1,1) model. The GARCH(1,1) 
model is estimated with the independent variables in the mean and variance equations. The exact 
specification of the GARCH(11) model is as follow: 
  
Mean equation ∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝜑0∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 − 𝜑1𝐶𝐻𝑂𝑆 − 𝜑2𝑅𝐼𝑂𝑇𝑆 −  𝜑3𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅 − 𝜑4𝑇𝐸𝑅 − 𝜑5𝐴𝑆 − 𝜑6𝐴𝐺𝐷+ 𝜀𝑡;  𝜀𝑡|𝐼𝑡−1~𝑁(0, ℎ𝑡2) 
 
Variance equation ℎ𝑡2 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜇𝑡−12 + 𝛽ℎ𝑡−12 + 𝜌1𝐶𝐻𝑂𝑆 + 𝜌2𝑅𝐼𝑂𝑇𝑆 +  𝜌3𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅 + 𝜌4𝑇𝐸𝑅 + 𝜌5𝑃𝐴 + 𝜌6𝐴𝐺𝐷 
 
Where ΔGDP represent economic growth rates, ΔGDPt-1 is a proxy of economic growth with one 
lag; CHOS is a proxy for change in the head of state, RIOTS is a proxy of racial conflict, INSUR 
is a proxy of the attempt to annex a section of the country (Rupununi), TER is a proxy of domestic 
terrorism, and PA is a proxy of the assassination of political leaders and AGD is a proxy for anti-
government demonstrations and politically motived strikes. The data for GDP growth rates cover 
the period 1961-2018. An inverse relationship is expected between economic growth and the 
various proxies of instability since the economy should be adversely affected by riots, insurrection, 
terrorism, the assassination of political leaders, and anti-government demonstrations. Thus, the 
estimated coefficients are expected to be negative and statistically significant. 
 
The GARCH (1,1) model is estimated using the Bolleslev-Wooldridge’s quasi-maximum 
estimator and Berndt-Hall-Hall-Hausman algorithm. The ARCH-LM test and Ljung-Box Q-
statistics are also employed to test the robustness of the estimated model.  
 
V. Discussion of results 
The unit tests reveal that the GDP series is stationary at the 1 percent level of significance. Table 
1 below shows the results from the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF, 1979), Phillip-Perron (PP, 
1998), and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS, 1992) unit root tests. The Zivot and 
Andrews (1992) unit root test with structural break provides similar results and suggests a 
structural break in 1991 (see Appendix A1). The correlation matrix shows that the relationship 
among the independent variables is weak, and there is no multicollinearity consequently (see 
Appendix A2).   
 
The AR(1) model estimated using the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and data for the period 1962-
2018 confirms that GDP is influenced by prior values in the models with and without the structural 
break at the 1% level of significance (see Appendix A3). Therefore, it follows that there is serial 
correlation or autoregression in the data series, which makes the GARCH (1,1) models suitable for 
the empirical exercise. The ARCH LM test also confirms the presence of heteroscedasticity in the 
data series. The Obs*R-squared is 3.602214, with an associated probability of 0.0577 (see 
Appendix A4).  
 
The ARCH(1) model is estimated with and without the structural break. The results are shown in 
Appendix A5. The coefficient for the lagged value of GDP in the mean equation is positive and 
significant in both models, suggesting that prior growth in GDP impacts on current growth rate. 
However, the RESID(-1)^2 is not statistically significant.  
 
The GARCH (1,1) model is estimated with and without structural breaks. The results are provided 
in Appendix A6, which confirms that the lagged GDP is statistically significant at the 1% level of 
significance. This means that the previous value of GDP impacts on the current value. The 
GARCH(-1) coefficient is also statistically significant at the 1% level of significance. It, therefore, 
means that the volatility in GDP is caused by volatility in the past. These shocks are also persistent, 
as reflected by the sum of the RESID(-1)^2 and GARCH(-1), which amounts to 0.73 (see 
Appendix A6). It is instructive to note that the coefficients of the conditional variance specification 
meet the stability conditions. 
 
The independent variables are added to the mean equation of the GARCH (1,1) model. The results 
suggest that Head of State (CHOS) changes have significant positive effects on GDP at the 5% 
and 10% levels of significance in model 5 and model 7, respectively (see Table 1). Therefore, it 
means that a change in the head of state enhances growth in the economy, probably due to the 
transitory goodwill enjoyed by the incoming Head of State that dampens the ethnic tensions and 
consequently lessen political instability. In two instances, death motivated the change in the head 
of state (Burnham in 1985 and Cheddi, 1997), and another instance, the president resigned, paving 
the way for the swearing-in of another whom the population displayed less hostility. Anti-
government demonstrations and strikes (AGD), on the other hand, causes growth in GDP to 
decline, as reflected in models 3 and 7 at the 5% level of significance (see Table 1). This is 
understandable since these events in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1990s directly affected the production 
and productivity of critical sectors. The strikes in the 1960s and 1990s caused major disruption in 
the capital city while the strike in the 1970s resulted in major losses for sugar, which was the most 
dominant sector in the economy. 
 
Table 1 report the following GARCH(1,1) model with independent variables in mean equation: 
Mean equation: ∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝜑0∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 + Break_91 − 𝜑1𝐶𝐻𝑂𝑆 − 𝜑2𝑅𝐼𝑂𝑇𝑆 −  𝜑3𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅 − 𝜑4𝑇𝐸𝑅 − 𝜑5𝐴𝑆 −𝜑6𝐴𝐺𝐷 + 𝜀𝑡;  𝜀𝑡|𝐼𝑡−1~𝑁(0, ℎ𝑡2) 
Variance equation: ℎ𝑡2 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜇𝑡−12 + 𝛽ℎ𝑡−12  
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 
Mean Equation               
C 0.653 0.649 1.046 0.799 0.544 0.665 0.278 
  [9.331]* [1.188] [1.933]** [29.526]* [0.890] [1.222] [0.508] 
GDP(-1) 0.563 0.562 0.593 0.574 0.555 0.563 0.535 
  [5.715]* [5.468]* [6.324]* [5.567]* [6.136]* [0.849]* [23.478]* 
Break_91 7.152 7.134 7.545 7.034 7.220 7.154 7.423 
  [0.011] [0.000] [0.454] [0.006] [0.000] [0.019] [0.001] 
RIOTS 0.950           0.480 
  [0.679]           [0.242] 
PA   1.742         2.919 
    [0.794]         [1.175] 
AGD     -4.968       -5.035 
      [-1.925]**       [-2.342]** 
TERR       1.917     0.984 
        [1.131]     [0.463] 
CHOS         2.937   3.450 
          [1.602]***   [1.962]** 
INS           5.815 6.201 
            [0.033] [0.023] 
Variance Equation               
C 3.743 3.875 4.425 4.694 4.381 3.713 4.863 
  [4.069]* [4.328]* [4.575]* [3.796]* [5.870]* [4.998]* [1.478] 
RESID(-1)^2 -0.063 -0.063 -0.059 -0.067 -0.065 -0.060 -0.057 
  [-1.885]*** [-6.756]* [-8.589]* [-2.391]** [-3.591]* [-2.274]** [-0.770] 
GARCH(-1) 0.748 0.736 0.692 0.708 0.702 0.735 0.598 
  [9.009]* [12.687]* [13.273]* [7.098]* [12.247]* [11.824]* [1.752]*** 
R-squared 0.14 0.186 0.242 0.170 0.225 0.163 0.424 
Adjusted R-squared 0.09 0.14 0.199 0.123 0.181 0.115 0.328 
Q-Stat (24 lags) 
35.956 
(0.055) 
30.901 
(0.157) 
23.656 
(0.481) 
32.875 
(0.107) 
31.544 
(0.139) 
29.609 
(0.198) 
21.787 
(0.592) 
ARCH LM  
0.041 
(0.839) 
0.049 
(0.825) 
0.0611 
(0.805) 
0.394 
(0.530) 
0.388 
(0.533) 
0.186 
(0.666) 
0.090 
(0.765) 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are the z-Statistics. 
*, ** and *** means that the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
The other forms of political instability, such as riots, insurrection, terrorism (crime spree), and 
political assassination, did not significantly impact growth rates. The dispersed nature of the 
economic activity, coupled with the fact that these events did not directly affect production or 
productivity, may be responsible for this outcome. In all the models estimated, the previous year's 
growth rates are significantly related to the current growth rate at the 1% level of significance (see 
Table 1). It is instructive to note that all the models passed the diagnostic tests (see Table 1). 
Additionally, they also satisfy the stability conditions.  
 
The independent variables were added to the variance equation of the GARCH (1,1) model. The 
results show that only change in the Head of State is statistically significant but negative (table 2). 
This suggests that GDP volatility is reduced with a change in the Head of State due probably to 
the new Head of State's goodwill that may have dampened hostility between the two largest ethnic 
camps. This, in turn, may have contributed to lower instability in those periods and therefore 
enhanced economic growth.  
 
  
Table 2 reports the following GARCH(1,1) model with independent variables in variance equation: 
Mean equation: ∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝜑0∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 + Break_91 + 𝜀𝑡;  𝜀𝑡|𝐼𝑡−1~𝑁(0, ℎ𝑡2) 
Variance equation: ℎ𝑡2 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜇𝑡−12 + 𝛽ℎ𝑡−12 + 𝜌1𝐶𝐻𝑂𝑆 + 𝜌2𝑅𝐼𝑂𝑇𝑆 +  𝜌3𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅 + 𝜌4𝑇𝐸𝑅 + 𝜌5𝑃𝐴 + 𝜌6𝐴𝐺𝐷 
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 
Mean Equation               
C 0.796 0.864 1.068 0.807 1.527 0.780 1.660 
  [3.471]* [1.841]*** [2.319]** [1.684]*** [255.293]* [3.073]* [1.719]*** 
GDP(-1) 0.577 0.579 0.595 0.574 0.427 0.575 0.393 
  [5.144]* [7.816]* [6.714]* [5.633]* [4.375]* [6.151]* [2.266]** 
Break_91 6.912 7.158 6.899 7.016 5.862 7.832 5.561 
  [0.0745] [0.138] [0.061] [0.000] [0.005] [0.539] [0.011] 
Variance Equation               
C 5.201 3.382 4.211 3.52 3.281 3.826 8.850 
  [1.224] [3.661] [2.189]** [0.912]* [1.427] [4.299]* [1.322] 
RESID(-1)^2 -0.062 -0.077 -0.067 -0.073 0.105 -0.062 0.060 
  [-1.815]*** [-2.453]* [-2.982]* [-5.614]* [0.769] [-2.514]* [0.352] 
GARCH(-1) 0.59 0.752 0.623 0.814 0.748 0.739 0.570 
  [1.586] [8.738]* [3.806]* [14.197]* [4.880]* [10.380]* [2.300]** 
RIOTS 10.387           1.835 
  [0.509]           [0.281] 
PA   6.838         12.869 
    [1.253]         [0.415] 
AGD     30.265       14.369 
      [0.811]       [0.432] 
TERR       -2.993     -5.662 
        [-0.717]     [-0.471] 
CHOS         -10.712   -19.039 
          [-1.911]***   [-1.889]*** 
INS           2.528 3.705 
            [0.154] [0.074] 
R-squared 0.134 0.133 0.122 0.135 0.157 0.134 0.156 
Adjusted R-squared 0.102 0.101 0.09 0.103 0.126 0.102 0.124 
Q-Stat 
(24 lags) 
38.183 
(0.034)  
36.002 
(0.055)  
 29.975 
(0.186) 
 35.210 
(0.065) 
 22.745 
(0.535) 
 32.035 
(0.031) 
25.372 
(0.386)  
ARCH LM  
0.143 
(0.706)  
0.196 
(0.658)  
0.075 
(0.784)  
 0.030 
(0.862) 
0.001 
(0.980)  
 0.055 
(0.815) 
 0.036 
(0.849) 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are the z-Statistics. 
*, ** and *** means that the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
VI. Conclusion and Recommendations 
This essay empirically examined the relationship between GDP growth and political stability using 
variables that capture the disruptions in the social and political landscape inspired by competition 
between the two major ethnic voting blocs for racial supremacy in Guyana. The article departs 
from previous studies by specifically exploring the impact of political instability on Guyana's 
economic fortunes since political instability has been a permanent feature of our political and 
economic history, and has manifested in various forms, anti-government demonstrations, riots, 
politically motivated crime wave, political assassinations, constitutional changes, insurrection. To 
a large extent, the various incarnations of political instability may be linked to the continuous 
struggle for political and economic power by the two largest ethnic voting blocs. Very often, the 
violence emanating from the conflict deteriorates to the point where it attracts descriptions such as 
'civil war' (Premdas, 1995) and 'near-genocidal' (Mars, 2001). Hinds (2010) contends that Guyana 
even becomes ungovernable. 
 
The empirical results show that change in the Head of State (CHOS) was positively related to 
economic growth, suggesting that these events stimulated economic growth. The results also point 
to a negative relationship between economic growth and the strikes, indicating that the country's 
economic fortunes were adversely affected by these activities. Riots, insurrection, political leaders' 
assassination, and politically motivated crime spree are not significant economic growth 
determinants. Additionally, change in the Head of State moderated the volatility of economic 
growth. 
 
While the findings are mixed, there are important policy implications. Firstly, the PNC has 
consistently used violence and anti-government demonstrations to destabilize every PPP 
government during the 1960s, 1990s, and 2000s. The empirical results suggest that these events 
have harmful effects on the economy. Secondly, there has been a noticeable intensification of 
political instability since 1992 (Hinds, 2010). If one accepts that the competition for resources by 
the two largest ethnic voting blocs is the main driver of political instability, then the recent 
discovery of oil may contribute to more intense conflict and cause greater political instability in 
the future (Khemraj, 2020). Thirdly, since current growth is affected by past economic 
performance, any slowdown caused by anti-government demonstrations can contribute to 
suboptimal economic performance. Therefore, it means that for Guyana to grow and develop, 
focus on the reducing binding constraints, while a necessary condition, is not sufficient. It is vital 
to have political stability, which necessitates reforms that would reduce disruption motivated by 
competition for power between the two largest ethnic voting blocs. Fourthly, the significant 
positive impact the change in Head of State (HOS) exert on economic growth highlights an 
important benefit associated with democratic turnover. Many viable solutions exist in the extant 
literature to promote democratic turnover, from federalism to constitutional reforms to ensure 
social and economic justice. Thus far, all the attempts to change the constitution, from the 1960s 
to 1990s, have failed to moderate the competition for political and economic power by the two 
largest ethnic voting blocs, which is the source of many political instability incarnations. It, 
therefore, means that a different approach to constitutional reforms is necessary.   
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Appendices 
A1. Unit Root Test. 
  
Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller  
Phillip-
Perron 
Kwiotkwoski-
Phillips-
Schmidt-Shin 
Zivot- 
Andrews 
Intercept -5.02095 * -5.0363 * 0.15678 * -6.087599* 
Intercept and trend -5.03902 * -5.0185 * 0.11227  * -6.185708* 
*, ** and *** means that variable is stationary at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
A2: Correlation matrix 
  
CHOS RIOTS INSUR TER PA AGD 
CHOS 1           
RIOTS -0.12585 1         
INSUR -0.04907 -0.04499 1       
TER -0.07001 -0.06419 -0.02503 1     
PA -0.13725 0.221728 -0.04907 0.220044 1   
STRIKES -0.08653 0.176295 -0.03093 -0.04414 0.152449 1 
 
A3: AR(1) model with and without structural break using data covering period 1962-2018 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient 
      
C 1.301 1.145 
  (0.666)*** (0.672)*** 
GDP(-1) 0.373 0.396 
  (0.125)* (0.125)* 
Break_91   6.132 
    (4.675) 
      
R-squared 0.140 0.166 
Adjusted R-squared 0.124 0.135 
F-statistic 8.937 5.387 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.004 0.007 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are the standard errors 
*, ** and *** means that the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
A4: ARCH LM Test 
F-statistic 3.712363     Prob. F(1,54)   0.0593 
Obs*R-squared 3.602214     Prob. Chi-Square(1)   0.0577 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
          
C 15.56787 6.741143 2.309381 0.0248 
RESID^2(-1) 0.253697 0.131671 1.926749 0.0593 
R-squared 0.064325       
Adjusted R-squared 0.046998       
F-statistic 3.712363       
Prob(F-statistic) 0.05928       
  
A5: ARCH (1) model for growth in GDP 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient 
Mean Equation     
C 1.091 0.856 
  (1.297) (0.955) 
GDP(-1) 0.433 0.483 
  (2.142)** (2.362)** 
Break_91   6.686 
    (3.840E-10) 
Variance Equation     
C 17.131 16.139 
  (6.158)* (6.066)* 
RESID(-1)^2 0.133 0.153 
  (0.943) (1.045) 
  
  
R-squared 0.136 0.159 
Adjusted R-squared 0.120 0.127 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are the z-Statistics. 
*, ** and *** means that the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
  
A6: GARCH (1,1) model of growth in real GDP 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient 
Mean Equation     
C 0.829 0.777 
  (1.601)*** (1.380E+00) 
GDP(-1) 0.575 0.572 
  (2.142)* (2.55E+01)* 
Break_91   7.619 
    (0.378) 
Variance Equation     
C 3.444 3.920 
  (3.822)* (6.066)* 
RESID(-1)^2 -0.067 -0.063 
  (-1.883)*** (-1.670)*** 
GARCH(-1) 0.796 0.740 
  (11.014)* (9.071)* 
      
R-squared 0.099 0.136 
Adjusted R-squared 0.082 0.136 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are the z-Statistics. 
*, ** and *** means that the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
